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pre-revolutiorury, revolutionary, and post-revolutionary leadership in Cuba
Mexico, and the United States, raoging from Fugencio Batista, Fidel Castro, Che
Guevera, J. Edgar Hoover and John F. Kennedy to political activist poups and
governrrcntal organizatiors such as the Cuban Commuuist Party, America's Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), aud Guerilla
regimes under Castro, left Cuban citize'ns hungry for a revolution both politically and
sociatly. This paper wifl discuss the different historical aspects of the Cuban Revolution
in its entirety and examine the different $yles of leaderstrip involved withtho fiarnework
ofCuba.
Once labeled a"thorn in our sidd' and now labeled more as a ?inpriclq" Fidel
Castro led a social revolution in Cuba ui{rich placed him in office, and wtrere he continues
as dictator today. As unlikety as it may seemtoday, dur'mg tlre 1950's Castro ernerged as
the only realhope for freedom and democracy'
Fidel Castro was born m1925 in eastem Cuba's ruggd sugar cane country where
his father had built a successful plantation. Befitting the son of a middle class landowner,
Fidel was sent to the University of Havana to study law.r Castro, however, became
extrenrelypolitically involved and joined activist $oups again$ the CubanCommunist
party. At this tire he had no ties to the communist group. Inaction by pofttical forces
after Fugencio Batista's assumed power pushed Castro'
Fugencio Batista, bom in 1901 in the United Fruit Corryany town of Banes in
Oriente Province, was the mulatto sort of farm fok.z Batista joined the army at age 20
after changing from ons job to another. Batista was well liked among political leaders in
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the United States knowing ofhis anti-Communist credentials. In 1933, Batista opened 
a
gateway for the reformist Ramon GraU San Marrtin's govenlglent after he led the
Sergeantos Revolt to take over the Gerardo Machado dictatorstrip. Batista later 
conspired
with Ambassador Sumner Welles and began to pbt to overthrow the Grau regime, urhich
was acc'sed of becoming infested with communist leaders. Batista was ttpn recognized
as the *only individual in Cuba u&o represented authoritt''by Jefferson Caffery.3 
In
1934 Batista, encouraged by the United States in hopes of a new government, became
Cuba,s new dictator. Under the wing of the United States, he trourrced any opposing
fotces to his reginre. He did not, however, become Cuba's President until 1940, wtren
there wa.s atrue and honest elec'tion Batista stepped down and settled inFtorida,
retumed to Cuba in 1948 to exploit a public revulsion against blatant governmental
comrptioru and seized power onMarch 10, 1952. The UnitedStates'political leaders
were under great suspicionthat Batista was in fact under oommwdst ideology, but after
teing misl€d by the dictator himself, extended diplomatic recognitionto the Batista
Government.
Wtrile all ofthis is goutr on, Fidel Castro was extremely hesitant and zuspicious
ofthe new rcgime's didpnest and undeserving international recognition Unlke many,
Castro was a bt bolder with his opposition and frvoritism to destroy Batista. July 26'
1953 marked the day that the now 26-yem-old leader led ottrer young mento attack the
Morrcada Army Barracks in Santiago de Cub. This attack played unfrvorably for this
group and ended in a bloody defeat wtrere they were jailed, tortured or killed. Many
historians believe that this was the birth ofthe Cuban Revolution Castro's goal was to
mov€ in as a surprise attack and take over the second largest garrison in Cuba. In a
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statement on Moncada after this attack, the Cuban Communist Party said this in the light
of future events: *We repudiate the putschist metlmds ofthe action in Santiago de Cuba
and Bayarno, '*,hich are clraracteristic of bourgeois political fractions and 
which was a
rash afiempt to take both military barracks. The heroisrr shown b,, tre participants in this
attack is false, sterile, for it is gulded by mistakenbourgeois conceptions.'/
Batista however, in light ofthe Communist celebration gomg oq blamed the
attack on thenU thus increasing their irritation against the Castroites.
Fidel Castro, in an attempt to spread the word about his revolutionary rrcssage'
obtained a tourist visa from the Anrcrican Embassy in Mexico City, and toured
Ptriladebhie Connecticut, New Jersey, and many otkr states. His goal was to spread the
word about the Revolution wtrere Cuban coumwdsm was supported in America. FBI
agents who detained him and interrogated tte yorrng exile at a m@ting of q@athizers
met him in Union City. Castro pledged that 
*in 1956 we will be free or we will be
martps,'o asserting drat his revohrtionary moverent had totally disoriented the Batista
regime, a grossly false clainf Castro appealed for a'tadical change in every aspect of
Cuba's political and social life."S
In the 1950's, Fidel Castro continued his efforts as a leader in training, reading a
lot and gaining know{edge, observing other rations who were dependent and moving his
way toward a world-view in preparations for ctange for his courfry. With continued
recognition from the U.S. througlr means of financial and foreign aid, Castro




conclusion that it would also be a revofution against the U.S. island interests'against the
Cuban dependency upon the United States tlrat the Batista regime sustained.6
Foflowing the legacies of 2f century revolutions in Mexico, Russia, Chin& etc.,
Castro saw that they have begun in peripberal location as if a striking force cores from
ttrc outside. Discontent and opposition against Batista had now grown island wide, but
the revolution lvas still unorganized and there was a lack of leadership. In 1956, many
instances of violence and revolts were rnet by fierce counter violence. Orre in particular
was with Frank Pais and his 
*July 26e followers" u/hen they virtually took over Santiago
de Cuba on November 3A, 1956. General Batista said the following: 'On Novernber 30,
a seditious otrtbrreak again bloodied the cily streets...There was no way 'Cornmunist
Elements,' and the guards were not 
nassassinated,o they killed in a hard fight in wtrich
sorne ofthe attackers were also killed and wounded."T
Although Batista saw clearly the revolution hitting close to home, tle continued
his strengthened relationship with the United States and his supporters. Fidel Castro
gained support for peasants and relied on their communication tunnel for information on
oounterattacks against Castro's regire and spread word to leaders about Batista's
retaliation. They had rerilrcn to be bitter toward the Crftan Government. They were poor
and differe,lrt fromtlre bettEr-off-frrmers and sugar workers ofthe rest ofCuba. Half of
the peasatrs were itliterate"
Sierra tvlaestra was used as a tire of gathering knowledge and training carys for
soldiers. Toward the end of 1957, Castro set up a permanent headquarters at La PltttU




govemment unifie4 members of the Communist party began contacting Castro. Castro
then began making statements saying that he was to stay tluoughout the Revotution and
that the old Cuban Communists were to be a part of the revolutionary administration but
nevsr to be allowed to get control of it. All the uifuile, Cuba went Manrist-Leninist, but
Batista continued to prove his anti-Communism to Wastrington and began labeling the
guerillas as Cornmrmists.
Che Guevara described the tire after 1957 a *period of consolidation" for a few
montlu. There was an armed truce with Batista's armed forces. Early in 1958, Castro, as
ustral, was short of arms. He sent Pedro Miret to Co$a Rica to appeal for help from
president Jose M. Figueres. Figueres sympathized and sent Castro a planeload of arms at
what was tlren a crucial time. Castro divided his 
*army'' into columns and was then
under the leaderdrip of direct supporters of Castro, for exanple his brother Raul and Che
Guevera. Castro, making the first mve out of silence, sent Raul withtis column to the
north coast ofQriente Province. The mission was to disnrpt transportation of all kinds
and establish a base of operations. His group was called'Column 6'' in order to give the
idea that there were at least five other columns atound, which there weren't.8 Raul began
making clever and aggressive gpenifla attacks capturing enemies. Guerrilla warfrxe
began to be a dominant source of fighting. Batista began receiving calls about defeats in
places like Santiago de Cuba, u/hi& meant the Oriente Province was lost.
Castrg didn't expect Batista to give up so quickly. On November 29, 1958, a
group of rebels entered Guisa and attacked the barracks. This was otre of many attacks in
a few weeks streak. Decernber 12, Cuban Foreign Minister Gonzalo Guell got word that
the U.S. would no bnger support the present Governrrent of Cuba and that it was their
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belief that President Batista was losing control. Early morning ofNew Year's Day,
Batista fled.
Washington had a desire to find a replacement for Batista and they made it clear
that it would not be Castro. Under Secretary ofState Robert Murphy, argued that "tastro
was not th man for Cuba and sorcthing should be done to stop him fromtaking
power.'oe The United States was unable to come up with an alternative, which directly
reflected its neglect in knowiag uihat rcalty was going on in Cuba.
In the meantime, Castro heard about Batista's escape inforrnafly and grew mgry,
calling for a gemeral strike. OnNew Year's Dan Castro urged an appeal to all Cubans
not to take the law into their ownhands. January 2d marked the day ofthe effective
general strike. Castro then declared Santiago de Cuh the provisional capital and declared
Manuel Umrtia as Provisional President. Castro then made a slow procession around the
island receiving muchpraise, grving speeches and reassuriug the Cubanpeople &at thre
is time now for hope.
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